Labor Law: The Duty of Fair Representation, Applicabililty of the NLRA and Other Seventh Circuit Cases by Gittler, Marvin
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 57 Issue 1 Article 9 
January 1981 
Labor Law: The Duty of Fair Representation, Applicabililty of the 
NLRA and Other Seventh Circuit Cases 
Marvin Gittler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Marvin Gittler, Labor Law: The Duty of Fair Representation, Applicabililty of the NLRA and Other Seventh 
Circuit Cases , 57 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 207 (1981). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol57/iss1/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
LABOR LAW: THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION,
APPLICABILITY OF THE NLRA, AND OTHER
SEVENTH CIRCUIT CASES
MARVIN GITTLER*
Among the significant recent developments in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the area of labor relations
during the 1979-80 term is the enumeration of a noninclusive list of
factors to be considered in determining whether a union has breached
its duty of fair representation.' The Seventh Circuit also rendered deci-
sions which delineated the scope of the coverage of the National Labor
Relations Act,2 examined the practices, procedures, and standards em-
ployed by the National Labor Relations Board,3 and reviewed Board
decisions in the areas of the duty to bargain, sympathy strikes, and em-
ployee protected activity.
4
* Partner, Asher, Goodstein, Pavalon, Gittler, Greenfield & Segall Ltd., Chicago, Ill. For-
mer chairman, Chicago Bar Association Labor Law Committee. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the able and diligent assistance of John Fisk, candidate for J.D., Illinois Institute of
Technology/Chicago Kent College of Law.
1. See text accohnpanying notes 11-45 infra.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as the Act or the NLRA]. See text
accompanying notes 52-87 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 140-202 infra. The National Labor Relations Board [here-
inafter referred to as the Board or the NLRB] was created in 1935 to administer the NLRA. It was
assigned the task of supervising representation elections and adjudicating unfair labor practice
cases. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 159(c)(I), 160(a) (1978).
4. See text accompanying notes 203-230 infra. This article focuses on cases decided under
the National Labor Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976) and the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976) [hereinafter collectively
referred to as the Labor Act]. However, during the 1979-80 judicial term there were important
decisions concerning the employment relationship. Although beyond the scope of this article,
these cases deserve mention: Burkhart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313
(7th Cir. 1980) (the flexible, administrative probable cause standard is appropriate for the issuance
of a warrant for an OSHA inspection whether the warrant is sought on the basis of an administra-
tive plan or employee complaints; once probable cause is established on the basis of an employee
complaint, OSHA may inspect the entire premises of the subject employer); Marshall v. N.L.
Industries, Inc., 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980) (an arbitrator's award does not preclude additional
relief under OSHA; acceptance of an arbitration award does not establish a waiver of an em-
ployee's rights under OSHA); Holder v. Old Ben Coal Co., 618 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1980) (Title
VII plaintiff applying for a job labeled "unskilled" must foreclose the possibility that his/her
application was rejected in order to hire a more experienced or better qualified applicant before a
primafacie unlawful discrimination case is established); Cedillo v. International Ass'n of Bridge
and Structural Iron Workers Local I, 603 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1979) (a local union's determination to
deny all memberships via a transfer program is not incapable, as a matter of law, of an offensive
disparate impact which violates Title VII); EEOC v. Kenosha Unified School Dist. No. I. 620
F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980) (the "substantially equal" standard, as applied under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, requires more than that the jobs be comparable, and an important differentiating
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION: BLIZNIK V. INTERNATIONAL
HARVESTER Co.
Background Considerations
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the statutory
duty of fair representation in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. I a
case arising under the Railway Labor Act.6 In that case, the Supreme
Court held that when Congress empowered unions to bargain exclu-
sively for all employees in a particular bargaining unit, thereby subor-
dinating individual interests to the interests of the unit as a whole, it
imposed on unions a correlative duty "inseparable from the power of
representation" to exercise that authority fairly.
7
The Supreme Court soon extended the fair representation analysis,
developed initially under the RLA, to a case arising under the NLRA.
8
The Court reasoned that the duty of fair representation is implicit in
the NLRA because that statute, like the RLA, affords to unions the
exclusive power to represent all the employees of a bargaining unit.9
While the existence of the duty of fair representation is now well
established, the requirements imposed by the duty have remained un-
clear. The Supreme Court has stated that a union is in breach of its
duty of fair representation when its conduct in processing employee
grievances is "arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith."' 0 Until the Sev-
task that accounts for a substantial amount of time on the job is sufficient to vitiate an assertion of
equality); Strand v. Hansen Seaway Serv., Ltd., 614 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1980) (section 10(c) of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1978), is to be
applied to compute the amount of compensation due to an injured employee engaged in irregular
employment); Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1979) (before a hearing
on the merits at which a contractor is found guilty of noncompliance with Ex. Ord. 11246, the
government may take no action which effectively debars a contractor from participation in gov-
ernment contracts); Carney v. Cummins Engine Co., 602 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1073 (1980) (the denial of a reservist employee's right to make up cumulative overtime op-
portunities, even if allowed by a collective bargaining agreement, is prohibited by the Veterans'
Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) (1976).
5. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
6. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the RLA].
7. 323 U.S. at 202-04. See also Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engi-
neers, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
8. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1952).
9. id at 337-38.
10. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). In that case, an employee sued his union alleging
that he had been discharged from his employment in violation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment between the employer and the union, and that the union had arbitrarily refused to take his
grievance to arbitration in breach of its duty of fair representation. The Supreme Court accepted
the proposition that a union could not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a
perfunctory fashion, but disagreed that an employee has an absolute right to have his grievance
taken to arbitration. ld at 191. The Court noted that if an individual employee could compel
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enth Circuit's decision in Bliznik v. International Harvester Co. ,I labor
unions had been left largely in the dark as to what conduct was re-
quired of them once a decision to process an employee's grievance had
been made.
Bliznik v. International Harvester Co.
International Harvester discovered one of its foremen in the act of
stealing industrial brass from its plant. When confronted, the foreman
admitted the theft and added that he had acted in concert with Bliznik.
Bliznik denied any involvement, but the company nevertheless dis-
charged him. 12
After exhausting the initial steps of the contractually-mandated
grievance procedure, Bliznik's union, the Progressive Steelworkers,
agreed to pursue his claim to arbitration.' 3 Shortly before the arbitra-
tion hearing, Bliznik met with the union's attorney, who did not inves-
tigate Bliznik's version of the events surrounding his discharge and did
not interview any of the witnesses named on the list that he provided. '
4
arbitration of his grievance regardless of its merit, the settlement machinery provided by the con-
tract would be substantially undermined. Id
The Supreme Court again considered the union's duty of fair representation in Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976). In that case, the Court held that where an
employee could establish the breach of the duty of fair representation by his union in the process-
ing of his grievance, the finality provisions of the collective bargaining agreement would not oper-
ate as a bar to suit against the union and employer. Id at 571-72.
In a recent decision, the Court held that the RLA does not permit the recovery of punitive
damages in an action brought against a union for breach of its duty of fair representation in
processing an employee's grievance against his employer. International Bhd. of Electrical Work-
ers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
1I. No. 79-2013 (7th Cir. Mar. 4, 1980). The case is cited at 618 F.2d 113. The order of the
court is unreported pursuant to Circuit Rule 35 which, before its amendment on July 1, 1980,
provided in pertinent part:
(a) Policy. It is the policy of the circuit to reduce the proliferation of published opin-
ions.
(b) Publication. The court may dispose of an appeal by an order or by an opinion,
which may be signed orper curiam. Orders shall not be published and opinions shall be
published.
(1) Unpublished orders:
(ii) Shal be distributed only to the circuit judges, counsel for the parties in the
case, the lower court judge or agency in the case, and the news media, and shall be
available to the public on the same basis as any other pleading in the case;
(iv) Except to support a claim ofresjudicala, collateral estoppel or law of the
case, shall not be cited or used as precedent (a) in any federal court within the circuit in
any written document or in oral argument or (b) by any such court for any purpose.
12. Bliznik v. International Harvester Co., No. 79-2013, slip op. at 6 (7th Cir. Mar. 4, 1980).
13. Id at 2.
14. Id The attorney advised Bliznik that testimony was unnecessary because in a recent case
involving the same union and company, the arbitrator had ordered reinstatement of an employee
who had admitted stealing company property. Id
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At the arbitration hearing, the foreman testified, consistent with
his statement to the company, that he stole the industrial brass pursu-
ant to a conspiracy with Bliznik. Bliznik denied any involvement and
the case became a contest between his word and that of the foreman.'
5
The attorney representing Bliznik did not cross-examine any of the wit-
nesses, object in any way to the admission of evidence offered by the
company, or call any witnesses other than Bliznik.' 6 The arbitrator up-
held the company's dismissal of Bliznik, relying primarily on his assess-
ment of the witnesses' credibility. 17 After the union declined to pursue
the matter further, Bliznik brought suit' 8 against his former employer
for wrongful discharge and against his former union for breach of its
duty to fairly represent him in the ensuing grievance arbitration.19
The district court granted the company and union's motion for
summary judgment.20 The district court agreed with the defendant's
argument that the plaintiff, Bliznik, had presented no evidence to
demonstrate arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith action.2' The dis-
trict court went on to note that negligence alone is insufficient to state a
cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation. 22 The dis-
trict court reluctantly concluded as a matter of law that the union attor-
ney's inaction was, at worst, simple negligence and, as such, insufficient
to serve as the basis of a claim for breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion.2
3
In an unpublished opinion,24 the Seventh Circuit reversed the dis-




18. The suit was brought pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976), which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization rep-
resenting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Id
19. No. 79-2013, slip op. at I.
20. Summary judgment is properly granted only when (I) no genuine issue of material fact
exists, and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law. FED. R.
Civ. P. 56(c).
21. Bliznik v. International Harvester Co., No. 78 C 2353, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1,
1979). The decision of the district court is not officially reported.
22. Id, citing Dente v. International Organ. of Masters Local 90, 492 F.2d 10, 12 & n.3 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974); Mangiaguerra v. D. & L. Transport, Inc., 410 F.
Supp. 1022, 1023 (N.D. 111. 1976).
23. Id
24. See note I I supra.
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low Bliznik an opportunity to show whether the union attorney
represented him in a perfunctory manner. 25 The Seventh Circuit di-
rected the district court not to place undue reliance on labels such as
negligence or perfunctoriness, but rather to adopt a pragmatic ap-
proach. 26 The court then proceeded to enumerate a non inclusive list of
factors to be considered in determining whether the union breached its
duty of fair representation. The district court was instructed to deter-
mine whether, under the circumstances, the union:
(1) conducted a fair investigation,
(2) provided Bliznik with a fair opportunity to participate in the
presentation of his case,
(3) presented arguments favorable to his case,
(4) refuted the employer's insubstantial claims, and
(5) presented Bliznik's claim in a favorable light.
27
The Seventh Circuit's enumeration of the factors to be considered
in determining whether a union has breached its duty of fair represen-
tation appears to be consistent with its analysis in earlier cases, particu-
larly Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp .28 In that case, the court
reversed the trial court and dismissed a claim that the defendant com-
pany had improperly discharged the plaintiff Cannon.
Cannon had refused to take a sobriety test at the request of his
employer after his involvement in an accident. Industry practice at that
time established a presumption of drunkenness as against employees
who refused to submit to a sobriety test. Drunkenness, under the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement, was sufficient cause for job ter-
mination.
Evidence adduced by the employer at the hearing before the joint
grievance committee revealed that the plaintiff had, in fact, refused to
take the test after the company explained the consequences of such re-
fusal and extended a second offer to take the test.29 In rebuttal, the
union representative argued on behalf of the employee, inter alia, that
it was unlikely plaintiff was drinking at eleven a.m., when the accident
occurred, and also pointed out that the employee had not been arrested
for being under the influence of alcohol.30 The representative sug-
25. Bliznik v. International Harvester Co., No. 79-2013, slip op. at 3 (7th Cir. Mar. 4, 1980).
The court relied on Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967), where the Supreme Court stated that a
union "may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory manner."
See note 10 supra.
26. No. 79-2013, slip op. at 3.
27. Id at 4.
28. 524 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1975).
29. Id at 293.
30. Id at 293-94.
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gested that the accident may have resulted from equipment defects for
which the employer was responsible, and concluded that the employee
had a good safety record during his eighteen years of employment, had
never had charges of intoxication placed against him, and "in my opin-
ion this fellow ought to be put back to work and compensated for all
time he lost." 3 1 Plaintiff employee testified that he had not been drink-
ing and that he did not know of his obligation to take the test. After
hearing the evidence and arguments, the joint grievance committee de-
nied the grievance.
32
The Seventh Circuit found, as a matter of law, that the business
agent had made a good-faith effort to plead the plaintiff's case at the
hearing.33 The court noted that the union acted without malice or
prejudice and that under established procedure, absent proof that the
duty of fair representation was breached, federal labor policy encour-
aging settlement of labor disputes through means chosen by the par-
ties34 required that the determination of the committee not be
reviewed.3
5
The Cannon rationale can be contrasted with the record in the re-
cently decided case of Miller v. Gateway Transportation Co. 36 In Miller,
the union's representation of an employee at a grievance proceeding
consisted solely of a reading of the employee's written grievances.
37
The Seventh Circuit noted that the union had failed to urge an avail-
able defense, had conducted no investigation, and had made no at-
tempt to locate witnesses or obtain relevant records. The court
concluded that a genuine issue existed as to the question of fair repre-
sentation and remanded the case to the district court for further pro-
ceedings.
38
31. Id at 294.
32. Id
33. Id at 293.
34. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Co., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); See also
29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976).
35. 524 F.2d at 294-95. The employee argued that a breach of the duty was established by
the union's failure to raise a defense at the hearing that the industry practice of requiring a sobri-
ety test was improperly promulgated under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. This
argument was rejected by the court. Absent a showing of arbitrariness or bad faith, the union's
failure to raise a relevant defense does not breach the duty of fair representation even if such
failure "was an act of neglect or the product of a mistake in judgment." Id at 294. This proposi-
tion appears to be an accurate statement of the case law. See, e.g., Baldini v. Local 1095 UAW,
581 F.2d 145, 151 (7th Cir. 1978); Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3rd Cir.
1970).
36. 616 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1980). The case was decided about one month before Bliznik.
37. Id at 277.
38. Id The court stated: The relevant inquiry is not "whether the union in fact pursues an
employee's grievance," but rather "whether the union has made a full investigation, has given the
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It appears that courts indeed will be paying more attention to the
quality of a union's actions in representing aggrieved workers. The is-
sue of "negligence" in the processing of grievances, which is usually
raised in the context of an employee arguing the Vaca and Hines
39
expression of "perfunctory action," appears to be generating considera-
ble litigation.40 While the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bliznik lacks
precedential value,41 it nonetheless provides invaluable guidance as to
the types of union conduct to which the court will ascribe the hereto-
fore malleable concepts of "arbitrary" or "perfunctory." Such gui-
dance is of obvious aid to unions in the determination of what steps
they must take in the handling of employee grievances in order to
avoid breaching their duty of fair representation. The factors enunci-
ated by the court are, however, also useful to the individual employee
and the employer. They, too, have a stake in defining the parameters
of the duty of fair representation.
Whether the Seventh Circuit will enumerate the Bliznik factors in
a published opinion of precedential value is an interesting matter on
which to speculate. Regardless of publication, the Bliznik factors are
indicative of the approach the Seventh Circuit will employ in analyzing
fair representation cases. The factors enunciated in the Bliznik case
could provide a positive standard for inquiry so long as they are not
mechanically applied.
4 2
A court's analysis in a fair representation case should never lose
sight of the totality of the union's conduct. The balance between the
policy of promoting private dispute resolution on the one hand, and
guaranteeing fairness to employees on the other, must recognize the
myriad factors that influence union judgments and actions in represent-
ing their constituency. 43 This balance can be maintained by recogniz-
grievant notice and an opportunity to participate, has mustered colorable arguments and has re-
futed insubstantial arguments by the employer." Id at 277 n. 12, citing R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW
ch. 30, §6 at 718 (1976).
39. See note 10 supra.
40. Compare Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 1975),
with Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972), and Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523
F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
41. See note II supra.
42. Perhaps, by avoiding publication of its opinion, the Seventh Circuit is seeking to avoid
just such a mechanical application of the Bliznik factors.
43. For example, the issue of "investigating" a grievance cannot be measured by analogies to
discovery devices available in federal litigation. Such devices are generally not available to un-
ions during arbitration or other dispute resolution procedures, although some compulsory process
may be had. See ILL. UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, § 107 (1975).
Questions relating to the relative sophistication of non-attorney representatives must arise in
any analysis of a representative's obligation. It does appear that the duty is evolving into an
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ing the distinction between honest mistaken conduct and intentional,
severely hostile and irrational treatment. 44 In such a context, the analy-
sis in B/iznik does provide a positive means of effectuating the judicial
and statutory policies enunciated since Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R..45
THE SCOPE OF THE COVERAGE OF THE NLRA
The threshold inquiry for NLRB intervention in any labor dis-
pute46 is jurisdiction.4 7 The statutory range of Board jurisdiction ex-
tends to the breadth of the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution, 48 and in recent times there has been an expansion of the
exercise of this jurisdiction. 49 The Seventh Circuit reached decisions in
several cases during the 1979-80 term which further delineated the
scope of the coverage of the NLRA. 50 In a series of related cases, the
court restricted the coverage of the Act and the jurisdiction of the
"attorney-client" relationship, although this is not uniformly accepted. See, e.g., Difini v. Spector
Freight Systems, 101 L.R.R.M. 3055 (D.C.N.Y. 1979).
Beyond the scope of this paper, but of obvious relevance to future analyses, is precisely the
issue loosely defined as the "quality" of representation once a decision to proceed to arbitration is
made. For example, if an "attorney-client" standard is to be imposed on lay representatives, will
the courts eventually require that attorneys be made available in dispute resolution proceedings?
If attorneys are employed, should they be held to a higher standard than a lay representative? The
court in Bliznik may have been influenced by the fact that the grievant's representative was an
attorney and not a lay representative. Note, by way of comparison, the court's treatment of an
attorney representative in an earlier case, Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191 (D.C. Conn.
1974), aftdas modified, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1975).
44. See Street v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
45. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
46. The NLRA § 2(9), 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1976), defines "labor dispute" as: "any contro-
versy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee."
47. The Board has the power to determine any "question of representation affecting com-
merce" and "to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting
commerce." 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c)(1), 160(a) (1976). "'[Alffecting commerce' means in commerce,
or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 152(7)
(1976).
48. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). However, the Board need
not exercise jurisdiction this broad, and in the interests of manageability it has promulgated rules
for the discretionary exercise of its jurisdiction, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976). These
standards usually involve dollar amount minima of interstate commerce engaged in by the em-
ployer. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 22-26 (1976).
49. See, e.g., 30 Sutton Place, 240 N.L.R.B. 752 (1979) (condominiums and cooperative as-
sociations subject to the Board's jurisdiction); Foley, Hoag, & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456 (1977) (law
firms); Cornell University, 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970) (university faculties brought under Board
jurisdiction).
50. See text accompanying notes 52-87 infra.
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NLRB.5'
The court upheld the Board's assertion of jurisdiction in NLRB v.
Austin Developmental Center, Inc. 52 The Austin Developmental
Center, 53 a not-for-profit corporation, provided educational and coun-
seling services to school-age children designated by the Chicago Board
of Education as incapable of functioning within the public school sys-
tem. The primary sources of ADC's funding are the Illinois Depart-
ment of Mental Health and the Chicago Board of Education.54 ADC
asserted that section 2(2) of the Act,55 which excludes "political subdi-
visions" from coverage, deprived the Board of jurisdiction over its op-
erations, arguing that its "close and intimate relationship with the
state" brought it within the scope of section 2(2).56
The Board had found that the statutory limitation of section 2(2)57
did not apply to exclude ADC from the coverage of the Act. 58 The
Seventh Circuit indicated that Board rulings on its own statutory juris-
diction are entitled to great weight and upheld the Board's determina-
tion that statutory jurisdiction existed.5 9 The court reasoned that
ADC's lack of control over the wages and benefits of its employees, due
to budgetary limitations imposed by its dependence on public funds,
was not the type of control over ADC's labor relations required to in-
voke the section 2(2) exemption. 60 Noting that neither the Illinois De-
partment of Mental Health nor the Chicago Board of Education
specifically limited ADC's employee compensation expenditures, the
court indicated that the Board may require collective bargaining even
51. See Lutheran Welfare Serv. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Chicago
Youth Centers, 616 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1980).
52. 606 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1979).
53. Hereinafter referred to as ADC.
54. 606 F.2d at 788.
55. Section 2(2) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976), provides, in relevant part: "The
term 'employer'. . . shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corpo-
ration, . . . or any state or political subdivision thereof." Id
56. 606 F.2d at 789.
57. The statutory limitation contained in section 2(2) has not been broadly construed. The
Board defines "political subdivision" as (1) an entity created by the state so as to constitute an arm
of government, or (2) an entity administered by persons who are responsible to the electorate or to
public officials. NLRB v. Highview, Inc., 590 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1979), modified on other
grounds, 595 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1979); Compton v. National Maritime Union, 533 F.2d 1270, 1274
(1st Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court has acknowledged this two-part test, but has indicated that it
does not necessarily define the boundaries of the political subdivision exclusion. The Supreme
Court will look at an entity's other attributes as well, such as a broad power of subpoena or
eminent domain, in determining whether it is a political subdivision. NLRB v. Natural Gas Util-
ity Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 604-07 (1971).
58. Austin Developmental Center, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 134 (1976).
59. 606 F.2d at 789.
60. Id. at 789 n.8.
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where the employer's relationship to the exempt entity places it under
substantial hardships in labor negotiations, so long as it retains some
control over terms and conditions of employment.
6'
The Seventh Circuit also rejected ADC's contention that the
Board's exercise of its statutory jurisdiction constituted an abuse of dis-
cretion.62 The Board, the court stated, has broad discretion in choosing
whether or not to exercise its statutory jurisdiction and will not be re-
versed absent a showing that it acted unfairly and caused substantial
prejudice to the affected employers. 63 Moreover, the court disagreed
with ADC's assertion that the Board erroneously applied the "intimate
connection" test, 64 a discretionary rule formerly used to decline juris-
diction where the purposes of the Act would be furthered thereby.65
The court found that ADC had failed to establish that the services
which it provided were "interwoven and integrated" 66 with the opera-
tions of an exempt agency. The court recognized the Board's discretion
as the overriding factor in such cases.
67
Finally, the court rejected ADC's argument that it was an "ad-
junct" 68 of the public school system because of its relationship to the
61. Id
62. Id. at 792.
63. Id. at 790.
64. A leading case enunciating the "intimate connection" test is Rural Fire Protection Co.,
216 N.L.R.B. 584 (1975), where the majority described the test as having two aspects: (1) whether
the nonexempt employer retains sufficient control over its employees' terms and conditions of
employment so as to be capable of effective bargaining with the employees' representative, and (2)
where the employer retains such control, "the focus of necessity is on the nature of the relationship
between the purposes of the exempt institution and the services provided by the nonexempt em-
ployer." Id. at 586. Recently the Board has said that it will not use the "intimate connection test"
in the future. National Transp. Serv., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 565 (1979).
65. Even if jurisdiction is proper under the Act, the Board has traditionally followed the
policy of declining to assert jurisdiction if it finds that to do so would not effectuate the purposes
of the Act. See, e.g., Highview, Inc. v. NLRB, 590 F.2d 174 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds,
595 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1979); Compton v. National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO, 533
F.2d 1270 (1st Cir. 1976); Herbert Haryey, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
The Board has declined to assert jurisdiction over an employer that supplies an exempt insti-
tution with services that are an essential attribute of the purpose of the exempt institution. Thus,
the Board has declined to assert jurisdiction over a private company that provided: (I) fire protec-
tion to a political subdivision, Rural Fire Protection Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 584 (1975); (2) police pro-
tection to a political subdivision, The Wackenhut Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. 86 (1973); (3) park
maintenance to a political subdivision, Current Construction Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 584 (1974). Ac-
cording to the Board, each of these services-fire, police, and park maintenance-is essential to
the purposes of the political subdivision.
66. The court stated that "ADC has shown only that some of its employees must meet state
certification requirements and that its facilities must comply with the building code. These restric-
tions. . . do not establish an intimate connection betwen the State Department of Mental Health
and ADC." 606 F.2d at 790.
67. Id. at 791.
68. Board decisions recognize a discretionary limitation on the Board's jurisdiction where the
employer provides special education services for a public school system in such a manner that the
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Chicago Board of Education. ADC was not an "adjunct" of the public
school system, the court ruled, because (1) the exemption is applicable
only where the public agency chooses to contract with private employ-
ers as the primary means of satisfying its statutory obligation,69 and in
this situation ADC merely handled the overflow of the special educa-
tion programs of the Chicago Board of Education; and (2) the exemp-
tion only applies where the private school demonstrates direct and
substantial control over its operations by the contracting agency.
70
Since the record indicated only minimal control71 over ADC on the
part of either the Board of Education or the Department of Health, the
NLRB did not abuse its discretion in choosing to exercise its statutory
jurisdiction.72 The court, accordingly, granted the Board's application
for enforcement of its order against ADC.
Just six days after its decision in Austin Developmental Center, the
Seventh Circuit confronted the jurisdictional issue again in Lutheran
Welfare Services v. NLRB ,7 3 this time denying enforcement of the
Board's order. The employers 74 in that case operated child care facili-
ties in Chicago under the Federal Headstart and Daycare programs.
75
The bulk of the funding for the involved facilities was received from
Model Cities--Chicago Committee on Urban Opportunity, 76 a local
public agency charged with administering federally funded social wel-
fare programs.
77
The court determined that Model Cities was empowered to exer-
employer may be considered an "adjunct" of the school system. See, e.g., Perkins School for the
Blind, 225 N.L.R.B. 1293 (1976); Mitchell School, Inc. and Main Line Day School, Inc., 224
N.L.R.B. 1017 (1976); Pennsylvania School for the Deaf, 213 N.L.R.B. 513 (1974).
69. 606 F.2d at 791. See George Junior Republic, 224 N.L.R.B. 1581, 1582 (1976).
70. 606 F.2d at 791.
7 1. Aside from the lack of control over the wages and benefits of its employees due to budg-
etary limitations imposed by its dependence on public funds, ADC showed only that some of its
employees must meet state certification requirements and that its facilities must comply with the
building code. NLRB v. Austin Developmental Center, Inc., 606 F.2d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 1979);
See also Austin Developmental Center, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 134, 135 (1976).
72. 606 F.2d at 791.
73. 607 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1979).
74. Charges involving two separate employers, Lutheran Welfare Services of Illinois and
United Christian Community Services, were consolidated since the employees of both were repre-
sented by the same union and similar operations were involved. Lutheran Welfare Serv., 236
N.L.R.B. 1018 (1978).
75. The Headstart program is administered pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2928 (1978). The Day-
care program is based upon Title XX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (1976). Head-
start regulations limit federal funding to 80% of the approved costs of a program. 45 C.F.R.
§ 1301.20 (1979). The remaining 20% is generally covered by cash or in-kind contributions by the
grantee designated by HEW. Title XX requires no in-kind or cash contributions toward the oper-
ation of the daycare center by the delegate agency.
76. 607 F.2d at 778.
77. The Board conceded that Model Cities was exempt from the coverage of the Act. Id
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cise substantial control 78 over labor relations at the Headstart and Day-
care centers. The court concluded that Model Cities and the employers
involved were "joint employers" 79 under the NLRA, and since a collec-
tive bargaining agreement was not feasible under such circumstances,
the NLRB lacked jurisdiction.80
In three cases8' which, like Lutheran Welfare, involved the Model
Cities, Headstart, and Daycare programs, the Seventh Circuit again
ruled that the employers involved were exempt from the coverage of
the Act. The court attempted to distinguish Austin Developmental
Center by noting that it involved different public agencies and a differ-
ent program,8 2 and that the employer in Austin had failed to establish
that it lacked control over its labor relations sufficient to invoke the
section 2(2) exemption.
83
The court's attempt to reconcile Austin Developmental Center with
Lutheran Welfare, and the later cases involving Headstart and Daycare
facilities, is unconvincing. These cases all involve discretionary limita-
tions on the exercise of Board jurisdiction. In such situations it is not
the characterization of the relationship between the exempt and nonex-
empt entities involved which should control the exercise of the Board's
78. The court noted that Congress had provided that the agency [Model Cities] charged with
administering Headstart programs "shall adopt for itself and other agencies using funds or exer-
cising authority for which it is responsible, rules designed to establish specific standards governing
salaries, salary increases, travel and per diem allowances, and other employee benefits . 42
U.S.C. § 2928f(a) (1978) (emphasis supplied by the court).
79. Where "joint employment" exists, each of two employers has such significant control
over the essential elements of labor relations with a single group of workers that collective bar-
gaining which did not involve both employers would be ineffective. S. S. Kresge Co. v. NLRB,
416 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1969).
80. 607 F.2d at 778.
81. NLRB v. Chicago Youth Centers, 616 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1980). Three cases were con-
solidated on appeal and a brief per curiam opinion rendered which, relying on the decision in
Lutheran Welfare Serv. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1979), denied enforcement of the Board's
orders in all three cases.
82. 616 F.2d at 1030. The Austin Developmental Center was operated by the Illinois Depart-
ment of Mental Health from 1969 to 1974. In 1974, it assumed the status of a private non-profit
corporation. The Department of Mental Health and the Chicago Board of Education were the
primary sources of the Center's funding. Of the 1975 total budget of $309,676, Department of
Mental Health grants accounted for $236,837, in-kind contributions provided another $56,954,
and Board of Education tuition reimbursements amounted to $11,698. NLRB v. Austin Develop-
mental Center, 606 F.2d 775, 788 (7th Cir. 1979). The Board of Education is required by statute to
pay the tuition costs for students attending non-public special education facilities where the reason
for their attendance is the inability of the Board's own special education programs to provide the
needed services. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (1979).
The Headstart and Daycare programs involved were federally funded, see note 75 supra, and
administered by a grantee designated by HEW, in this case the Model Cities--Chicago Commit-
tee on Urban Opportunity, an agency of the City of Chicago. NLRB v. Chicago Youth Centers,
616 F.2d 1028, 1029 n.2 (7th Cir. 1980).
83. 616 F.2d at 1030. See notes 55 and 57 supra.
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discretionary jurisdiction,8 4 but rather the efficacy of applying the
NLRA to the nonexempt employer.
85
In Lutheran We/fare and its progeny, 86 the Seventh Circuit substi-
tuted its judgment for that of the NLRB in ruling that the purposes of
the Act would not be furthered by the Board's assertion of jurisdiction.
The court inadequately examined the efficacy of applying the NLRA to
the nonexempt employer when it simply asserted that "collective bar-
gaining is not feasible" in a joint employment situation involving an
exempt employer.8 7 The employees of the operations involved in those
84. In NLRB v. Austin Developmental Center, Inc., 606 F.2d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 1979), the
court emphasized the importance of properly classifying a jurisdictional limitation as statutory or
discretionary. Oddly enough, the court failed to make the distinction between discretionary and
statutory limitations on the exercise of Board jurisdiction in reaching its decision in Lutheran
Welfare Serv. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1979). It seems clear, however, that joint employer
status is no more an aspect of section 2(2)'s statutory limitation on Board jurisdiction than the so-
called "intimate connection" test. See Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir.
1969). A finding of joint employer status certainly does not render a private employer a political
subdivision exempt from the coverage of the Act.
85. The characterization of the relationship between the exempt and nonexempt entities
should only be considered relevant in an inquiry as to the propriety of the Board's exercise of its
discretionary jurisdiction insofar as it defines the extent of the nonexempt entity's control over its
own labor relations. Thus, while a joint employment relationship involving an exempt entity will
often give rise to a situation where the Board should decline to exercise its jurisdiction, it is cer-
tainly not true that in all such situations the nonexempt employer will never be able to bargain
effectively with its employees. See, e.g., Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
In deciding to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over Lutheran Welfare Services of Ill.
and the other day-care centers operating under the aegis of Model Cities, the Board determined
that the exercise of jurisdiction would effectuate the purposes of the Act. This determination was
based upon a finding that the involved employers could bargain effectively with a union despite
Model Cities' guidelines. See Lutheran Welfare Serv., 216 N.L.R.B. 518, 519 (1975); The Chase
House, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 792, 793 (1978); Chicago Youth Centers 235 N.L.R.B. 915 (1978);
YMCA of Metropolitan Chicago, 235 N.L.R.B. 788, 789 (1978); See also Catholic Bishop Corp.,
235 N.L.R.B. 776 (1978), and Hull House Ass'n, 235 N.L.R.B. 797 (1978).
86. See note 51 supra.
87. Lutheran Welfare Serv. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 777, 778 (7th Cir. 1979). The court failed to
adequately address a number of factual determinations underlying the Board's conclusions that
the delegate agencies involved in those consolidated cases could indeed bargain effectively with
their employees. For example, the Board heard testimony which established that Model Cities
guidelines did not prevent the involved employers from hiring or discharging their personnel
without Model Cities approval. The nonexempt employers could also increase the compensation
of their employees, beyond that provided by Model Cities' funds, through the use of private fund-
ing. See, e.g., The Chase House, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 792 (1978). The Board also found that the
employees at one day-care facility had successfully negotiated a collective bargaining agreement
with an employer funded by Model Cities which changed existing personnel policies and signifi-
cantly improved the working conditions of the employees. See Hull House Ass'n, 235 N.L.R.B.
797 (1978).
It is essentially a question of fact as to whether the exempt entity's control over the labor
relations of operations of a nonexempt employer is such that the NLRA cannot be efficaciously
applied. The Seventh Circuit has failed to show an adequate basis for overturning the factual
determination of the Board that the Act could be efficaciously applied.
Although collective bargaining under these circumstances may present substantial difficulties
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cases have been denied the protections of the Act. Decisions with such
an impact deserve more careful consideration.
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW OF THE PRACTICES, PROCEDURES, AND
STANDARDS OF THE NLRB
Denial of Enforcement of Board Orders
The Seventh Circuit decided a number of cases in 1979-80 in
which the court's primary focus was on the practices, procedures, and
standards employed by the NLRB. In those decisions in which the
Seventh Circuit refused to uphold Board practices, procedures, or stan-
dards, the court relied primarily on determinations that the Board's
conduct was in conflict with established judicial or Board precedent.
The Seventh Circuit relied on judicial precedent to deny enforce-
ment of an NLRB order in Hendricks County Rural Electric v. NLRB.
88
In Hendricks County, the Board had determined that a personal secre-
tary was an "employee" within the meaning of the Act 89 since she did
not assist or act in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate
management policy in the field of labor relations.90 The Seventh Cir-
cuit rejected the standard employed by the Board and indicated that all
confidential secretaries are to be excluded from the coverage of the Act,
regardless of any employment nexus with labor relations policies. 9'
In rejecting the standard employed by the Board, the Seventh Cir-
cuit relied extensively on the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley
Act 92 of 1947 as interpreted by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace .9 3 There, the Supreme Court had confronted the issue of
whether buyers in an employer's purchasing department were statutory
employees or excluded from the coverage of the Act as managerial em-
for the employer, this is a situation in which the Board's discretion should be given controlling
effect. See NLRB v. Austin Developmental Center, Inc., 605 F.2d 785, 789 n.8 (7th Cir. 1979).
88. 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979).
89. Section 2(3) of the Act defines "employee" as follows:
The term 'employee' shall include any employee,. . . but shall not include any individ-
ual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or
person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individ-
ual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a
supervisor ....
28 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
90. The NLRB has held that confidential employees are excluded from the coverage of the
Act, but only if they "assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, deter-
mine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations." B. F. Goodrich Co., 115
N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956).
91. 603 F.2d at 30.
92. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976)).
93. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
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ployees. The Board conceded that the buyers were managerial, but ar-
gued that they were covered by the Act, since their jobs were unrelated
to the "formulation and implementation of labor relations policies."
94
The Supreme Court analyzed the legislative history of that provi-
sion of the Taft-Hartley Act which excluded "supervisors" from the
coverage of the NLRA.95 Relying on this legislative history, the Bell
Aerospace Court concluded that confidential employees were persons
"who both the House and the Senate believed were plainly outside the
Act."'96 Proceeding from the interpretation that confidential employees
were excluded from the coverage of the Act, the Court reasoned that
managerial employees also should be impliedly excluded. 97  The
Supreme Court thus held that all managerial employees were excluded
from the Act without regard to any nexus between their jobs and labor
relations.
In BellAerospace, the Supreme Court did not consider whether all
secretaries acting in a confidential capacity were to be excluded from
the coverage of the Act without regard to a labor relations nexus. In
Hendricks County, however, the Seventh Circuit relied on the Bell
Aerospace Court's interpretation of the legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act and determined that all confidential secretaries are ex-
cluded from the coverage of the Act. 98 The court, therefore, remanded
Hendricks County to the NLRB for a redetermination of the personal
secretary's confidential status.99
While the conclusion of the Seventh Circuit in Hendricks County
may be consonant with the dicta of the Supreme Court in Bell Aero-
space, other circuits have reaffirmed the traditional "labor nexus" stan-
dard of the Board.' °° The appropriate standard for determining
94. Id at 272.
95. Section 2(11) of the Act provides:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of the em-
ployer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or
discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of in-
dependent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976).
96. 416 U.S. at 283.
97. The Court concluded that "[slurely Congress could not have supposed that, while 'confi-
dential secretaries' could not be organized, their bosses could be." Id. at 284.
98. Hendricks County Rural Elec. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 25, 30 (7th Cir. 1979).
99. Id.
100. See Union Oil Co. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1979), which reaffirmed the tradi-
tional Board standard under B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956), that the employee,
to be excluded, must assist in a confidential capacity with respect to labor relations. Accord,
NLRB v. Allied Prod. Corp., 548 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1977).
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confidential employee status, and the resolution of the conflict among
the circuits, must therefore await a ruling by the Supreme Court.
The Seventh Circuit again relied on judicial precedent to deny an
NLRB order in Mary Thompson Hospital, Inc. v. NLRB.' 0 In that
case, the court harshly criticized the NLRB for what it perceived as the
"failure of the Board to adhere to established judicial precedent regard-
ing bargaining unit determination in the health-care industry."' 102 The
NLRB had determined that a unit of four licensed stationary engineers
employed by the hospital was appropriate for purposes of collective
bargaining. 0 3 The hospital refused to bargain with the certified repre-
sentative of the engineers, and the Board found that this conduct vio-
lated section 8(a)(5) of the Act.' °4
The court was critical of the Board for continuing to rely upon its
traditional "community of interest" standards, 0 5 developed in the in-
dustrial context, to determine proper bargaining units in the health-
care industry. 0 6 The Board was further admonished for its failure to
abide by a recent decision of the Third Circuit10 7 which had employed
similar reasoning to strike down a Board unit determination in the
health-care field. 108
In Midwest Stock Exchange v. NLJRB, 10 9 the Seventh Circuit again
denied enforcement of a Board order, determining in this instance that
the NLRB had impermissibly departed from its own precedent. The
Exchange had challenged the validity of the NLRB's certification of a
union representing all of its full and part-time office and clerical work-
ers, alleging that the union's authorized election observer had engaged
101. 621 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1980).
102. The court stated that the Board seemed to ignore precedent from federal appellate courts
in favor of its own interpretations of its own decisions. The court warned that such "flagrant
disregard of judicial precedent must not continue." Id at 864.
103. Mary Thompson Hosp., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 119 (1979).
104. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act provides that an employer commits an unfair labor practice if
he refuses "to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provi-
sions of section 159(a) of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(5) (1976).
105. The Regional Director found that the licensed stationary engineers enjoyed a community
of interest separate from other hospital employees because they were separately located, required
to be licensed, performed a highly specialized function, and had minimal contact with other em-
ployees. 621 F.2d at 863.
106. The Seventh Circuit's specific criticism was directed to the failure of the Board to heed
the congressional admonition against the proliferation of bargaining units in the health care field.
See S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3946, 3950.
107. St. Vincent's Hospital v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588 (3rd Cir. 1977), where the Third Circuit
rejected the Board's determination that four licensed boiler operators at a hospital constituted an
appropriate separate bargaining unit.
108. 621 F.2d at 862-63.
109. 620 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1980).
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in unlawful electioneering activity." I 0
An NLRB hearing officer found that the union's election observer
had engaged in numerous conversations with voters and that one such
conversation had lasted for five minutes or longer."'I The Board af-
firmed the findings of the hearing officer that the conversations were
innocuous and did not constitute unlawful electioneering." 1
2
The Seventh Circuit noted that judicial review of NLRB determi-
nations regarding the validity of representation elections is limited," 1
3
but concluded that the Board's decision in Midwest Stock Exchange
was either a misapplication of, or an impermissible departure from, its
previously announced policy. 114 The Board's previous policy, the Sev-
enth Circuit held, had established aper se rule which required a second
election whenever an election observer and a voter engaged in a con-
versation which lasted five minutes or longer, regardless of the content
of the conversation." -5 The Seventh Circuit, in effect, created aper se
rule which the Board itself was unwilling to impose.
The court's decision in Midwest Stock Exchange should be com-
pared to A & R Transport, Inc. v. NLRB. 116 In A & R Transport, the
Seventh Circuit refused to enforce that portion of a Board order relat-
ing to the coercive interrogation of an employee by an employer's at-
torney. In preparation for an unfair labor practice hearing that was to
be conducted three days later before an administrative law judge, the
employer's attorney, in the presence of its president, interviewed an
employee who was expected to be a witness at the hearing. The attor-
ney informed the employee that no reprisals would be taken against
him for anything that he might say. However, the attorney failed to
inform the employee that he could remain silent without fear of repri-
sal. '' 7
Although convinced that the omission of such assurances to the
110. Id at 630-31.
I11. Id at 631.
112. Id at 632.
113. The Court, citing Celanese Corp. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 224, 225 (7th Cir. 1961), noted that
the Board has "wide discretion" in the initial promulgation of rules and regulations establishing
the procedures and safeguards for conducting representation elections. 620 F.2d at 632. See also
NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946).
114. 620 F.2d at 635. In Milchem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362 (1968), the Board declared that
elections would be overturned where representatives of any party to the election engaged in "pro-
longed" conversations with voters waiting to cast their ballots, regardless of the content of the
remarks exchanged. In that case, the Board set aside an election where a union representative had
engaged in an estimated five-minute conversation.
115. 620 F.2d at 633-34.
116. 601 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1979).
117. Id at 312.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
employee by the employer's counsel was "inadvertent and free from
unlawful motivation,"'1 8 the AU concluded that it rendered the inter-
rogation unlawful because of the Board's previous ruling in Johnnie's
Poultry Co. 19 In that decision, the Board had set forth certain rules to
be observed by an employer in interrogating employees for a legitimate
purpose, and declared that failure to strictly adhere to those rules
would constitute aper se violation of the Act.' 20 The Board agreed
with the AL's application of Johnnie's Poultry to the attorney's con-
duct in A & R Transport.
12'
The Seventh Circuit, however, declined to approve the Board'sper
se rule and indicated that it would look to the "totality of the circum-
stances" surrounding the employee interrogation, including the pur-
pose of the interview, the entire statement made to the employee, and
the scope of the questioning.' 2 2 The court concluded that the circum-
stances presented by the interrogation at issue in A & R Transport indi-
cated a lack of coercion and, therefore, it refused to enforce the
provisions of the Board's order pertaining thereto.
23
Relying upon policy considerations, rather than judicial or NLRB
precedent, the Seventh Circuit denied enforcement of a Board order in
NLRB v. Gold Standard Enterprises, Inc. 124 The NLRB determined
that Gold Standard had committed various unfair labor practices
125
and ordered it to take "negative" and "affirmative" action' 26 to remedy
its unlawful conduct. The NLRB petitioned the Seventh Circuit for
118. Id
119. 146 N.L.R.B. 770 (1964), enforcement denied, 344 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1965).
120. The Board declared in Johnnie's Poultry:
[Tihe employer must communicate to the employee the purpose of the questioning, as-
sure him that no reprisal will take place, and obtain his participation on a voluntary
basis; the questioning must occur in a context free from employer hostility to union or-
ganization and must not be itself coercive in nature; and the questions must not exceed
the necessities of the legitimate purpose of prying into other union matters, eliciting in-
formation concerning an employee's subjective state of mind, or otherwise interfering
with the statutory rights of employees. When an employer transgresses the boundaries of
these safeguards, he loses the benefits of the privilege.
146 N.L.R.B. at 775 (footnotes omitted).
121. A & R Transport, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1084 (1978).
122. 4 & R Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1979).
123. Id Thus, the Seventh Circuit, inA & R Transport, refused to enforce aperse rule estab-
lished in Midwest Stock Exch. which the Board was willing to impose.
124. 607 F.2d 1208 (7th Cir. 1979).
125. The NLRB determined that Gold Standard had violated sections 8(a)(4), (3) and (1) of
the NLRA by discharging an employee for engaging in protected activity. Gold Standard Enter-
prises, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 618 (1978). See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4), (3) and (1) (1976).
126. This is the court's own characterization of the Board's order. The affirmative portions of
the order required reinstatement with backpay of the unlawfully discharged employee. The nega-
tive portions of the order consisted of generalized language requiring the employer to cease and
desist from engaging in future unfair labor practices. 607 F.2d at 1208-09.
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enforcement of its order, but withdrew the petition 127 when Gold Stan-
dard voluntarily complied with the affirmative portions of the order.
The NLRB repetitioned the court for enforcement of the negative
portions 128 of its original order against Gold Standard after an admin-
istrative law judge found a subsequent unfair labor practice, unrelated
to the others, had been committed. 29 The Seventh Circuit character-
ized the Board's second application for enforcement of its original or-
der against Gold Standard as an endeavor to have the court place
additional pressure on that employer in connection with a subsequent
unfair labor practice pending before the Board. ' 30 The court noted that
while it could readily ascertain whether an employer had complied
with an enforced affirmative order, a determination of whether an em-
ployer had complied with the negative aspects of the order would have
to be referred to a Master to conduct the appropriate evidentiary hear-
ing. '31 In view of the infirm basis of the merits of the Board's petition,
the Seventh Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order.
32
In Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 33 the Seventh Circuit declined
enforcement of a Board order holding that an employer's civil suit
against an employee for harassment did not constitute an unfair labor
practice. 134 The NLRB had determined that the filing of the civil suit
against the employee constituted an unfair labor practice and ordered
the employer to withdraw the civil action and reimburse the employee
127. The application was dismissed by the court without prejudice. The Board later argued
that since the dismissal was "without prejudice," it had an undoubted right to pursue the negative
aspects of its original order when further or new unfair labor practices were committed. The
Seventh Circuit rejected this argument by noting that the Board had failed to narrow its applica-
tion to those matters as to which there had not been compliance. Id. at 1209-10.
128. See note 127 supra.
129. NLRB v. Gold Standard Enterprises, Inc., 607 F.2d 1208, 1210 (7th Cir. 1979).
130. Id at 1213.
131. In the court's view, referral of the case to a Master would delay resolution of the case. Id.
In effect, the court is placing the burden on the NLRB to develop an evidentiary record in unfair
labor practice cases. This is undoubtedly where the burden belongs.
132. Id Although unnecessary to its decision, the court devoted a lengthy analysis to the
standard of review to be applied to Board decisions which overrule the decision of an Administra-
tive Law Judge. In dicta, the court referred approvingly to the distinction urged by Judge Wallace
of the Ninth Circuit between the deference the Board owes to the ALl's "testimonial inferences"
(great deference owed-based on witness demeanor) and "derivative inferences" (less deference
owed-based on inferences from evidence itself). Id at 1211. See also Penasquitos Village Inc. v.
NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1977).
133. 601 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979).
134. The employee filed a charge with the NLRB alleging, inter alia, that the employer's civil
suit was a violation of section 8(a)(4) of the NLRA. Power Systems, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 445, 447
(1978). Section 8(a)(4) of the Act provides in pertinent part that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed
charges or given testimony under this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1978). See also Nash v.
Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 238 (1967).
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for expenses incurred in his defense. 35 The Board's decision was pre-
mised on its finding that the employer had instituted the suit for an
improper purpose. 1
36
The Seventh Circuit found that the only evidence in the record
which supported the Board's finding of improper motivation was the
prayer for injunctive relief.137 The court additionally found that there
was substantial evidence to support a finding that the employer had a
reasonable basis for its civil suit. 138 The Seventh Circuit's denial of
enforcement of the Board's order in Power Systems represents a retreat
from the expansive protection previously afforded employees seeking
recourse to the Board.'
39
Approval of Board Standards and Procedures
As the previous cases demonstrate, the Seventh Circuit during its
1979-80 term clearly was dissatisfied with some of the practices, proce-
dures, and standards employed by the NLRB. In other cases, however,
the court did approve a variety of Board standards and discretionary
practices.
The Seventh Circuit approved an evidentiary ruling of the Board
135. Power Systems, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 445, 450-51 (1978).
136. The NLRB has consistently recognized the principle that the filing of a civil lawsuit by an
employer or labor organization is not a violation of the Act, so long as the suit is brought in good
faith and not in furtherance of an unlawful objective. See, e.g., Clyde Taylor Co., 127 N.L.R.B.
103 (1960); S.E. Nichols Marcy Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 75 (1977).
In Power Systems, the Board found that the employer lacked a reasonable basis for its civil
action and, therefore, an improper motive should be inferred. The Board inferred that the suit
"had as its purpose the unlawful objective of penalizing Sanford [the employee] for filing a charge
with the Board, and thus'depriving him of, and discouraging employees from seeking access to the
Board's process." 239 N.L.R.B. 445, 449-50 (1978).
137. The court noted that the prayer for injunctive relief was withdrawn upon the employer's
filing of an amended complaint. 601 F.2d at 940.
138. The court emphasized the fact that the Board had established special procedures to han-
dle the numerous complaints filed previously by the employee against other employers. The court
also noted with approval that Power Systems had inquired of the Board whether the contemplated
suit would violate the Act. (The answer was not affirmative, although it was inconclusive.) ld
The court chose to ignore the fact that the employee had filed only one other charge with the
Board against Power Systems, that being the instant case. See Power Systems, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B.
445, 446 (1978).
139. The Board has consistently given an expansive scope to the protections afforded by sec-
tion 8(a)(4), thereby confirming the crucial importance of that section to the effective operations of
the NLRA. See, e.g., General Nutrition Center, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 850 (1975) (section 8(a)(4)
protects supervisors as well as employees); Lamar Creamery Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1113 (1956) (sec-
tion 8(a)(4) protects job applicants); Howard Mfg. Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 731 (1977) (employer vio-
lated section 8(a)(4) by refusing to pay witness fees and mileage allowances to employees it had
subpoened to appear at a Board hearing). The Supreme Court has approved of the Board's ex-
pansive interpretation of section 8(a)(4) of the Act. See NLRB v. Scrivener, d/b/a AA Electric
Co., 405 U.S. 117 (1972); NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S.
418 (1968).
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in NLRB v. Local 90, Plasterers and Cement Masons.140 In that case,
the Board had ruled that illegally obtained recorded phone conversa-
tions were admissible in an unfair labor practice proceeding.' 4' The
court noted that although the evidence was obtained in violation of the
Illinois eavesdropping statute, 142 it is admissible in a federal adminis-
trative proceeding, such as a Board hearing, because federal law, not
state law, governs admission of evidence. 143
In NLRB v. Pan Scape Corp.,'" the Seventh Circuit upheld the
denial of a continuance by an administrative law judge. In that case,
the notice of hearing sent to the company specified that the hearing was
to be held on a specified date and "consecutive days thereafter until
concluded."'' 4 5 The hearing did not begin as scheduled on the specified
date because of the absence of the ALJ.146 The ALJ commenced the
hearing the following day and denied the request for a continuance
presented by the company's counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
AL's decision, noting that the grant or denial of a continuance is
within his discretion and will not be overturned absent a clear showing
of abuse. '47 The court concluded that the denial of the continuance in
Pan Scape Corp. was a reasonable exercise of the AL's discretion. 48
In a different context, the Seventh Circuit, in George Ryan Co. v.
NLRB, 149 again affirmed the reasonableness of the Board's exercise of
its procedural discretion. In George Ryan, the NLRB had approved an
informal post-complaint settlement agreement 50 over the objections of
140. 606 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1979).
141. Id at 191.
142. The recorded telephone conversations admitted by the Board into evidence were ob-
tained in violation of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-2(a) (1978). The unfair labor practice involved
a section 8(b)(I)(A) charge. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(I)(A) (1976). The nature of the unfair labor
practice involved would appear, however, to be irrelevant to the holding of the case.
143. 606 F.2d at 192. The court also indicated that this case did not raise a strong labor policy
requiring exclusion of taped conversations. Id at 192 n.2. Cf. Carpenter Sprinkler Corp., 238
N.L.R.B. 974 (1978) (tapes of collective bargaining negotiations excluded).
144. 607 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1979).
145. Id at 199.
146. Although the AL did arrive on the specified date, the company's officers, who were to
serve as witnesses at the hearing, and its counsel had already departed. Id at 199-200.
147. Id at 201.
148. The court concluded that what "precluded" the company from presenting its witnesses at
the hearing was not the denial of the continuance by the ALl, but rather the affirmative decision
of the company not to participate in the proceedings. The court also indicated that the company
had received adequate notice because the notice of the original hearing had related that the pro-
ceedings would continue for "all consecutive days thereafter until completed." 1d
149. 609 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1979).
150. The complaints alleged that a union had violated § 8(b)(i)(A), 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B), and
8(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A), 4(i) & (ii)(B), (e) (1976). Those subsections of § 8
make it an unfair labor practice for a union (1) to coerce employees in the exercise of their § 7
rights, including the right to refrain from union activities, (2) to engage in secondary activity, or
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the charging parties. '51 The Seventh Circuit held that the Board's sum-
mary denial of the charging parties' appeal was not an abuse of proce-
dural discretion, because the substantive contentions on which the
request was based did not involve questions of Board discretion, but
questions of statutory construction which had already been decided by
the courts. 52 The court acknowledged that its position conflicted with
that of four other circuits.'
53
The representation proceedings of the NLRB were examined in
Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, & Warehouse Workers v. NLRB. t5 4 In
that case, the Board had dismissed the representation petition of a
union after determining that the employer involved was subject to the
jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board pursuant to the Railway
Labor Act. I" The union filed suit in the district court seeking an order
to compel the Board to conduct an election.
The Seventh Circuit noted that NLRB decisions regarding certifi-
cation proceedings are not generally reviewable in the courts.' 56 The
(3) to enter an agreement with an employer whereby the employer agrees to cease doing business
with someone else.
151. The charging parties alleged that the union violated § 8 by including in its collective
bargaining agreement a provision binding all subcontractors of the contracting employer to the
terms of the agreement. The settlement agreement declared that provision "unenforceable and
void." 609 F.2d at 125 1. The ALJ did not state her reasons for accepting the settlement, and the
Board issued a telegraphic order summarily denying the charging parties' request for leave to
appeal. Id at 1252. The NLRB thus gave no explanation for the acceptance of the settlement.
152. Id at 1253.
153. The D.C. Circuit requires only that the Board either provide the charging party a reason-
able opportunity to be heard on its objections or state on the record its reasons for accepting the
settlement. See International Ladies Garment Workers Local 415 v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 823, 826-31
(D.C. Cir. 1974). Three other circuits require that the Board always state on the record its reasons
for approving a settlement despite the objections of the charging party. See NLRB v. Oil, Chemi-
cal & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 476 F.2d 1031, 1036-37 (Ist Cir. 1973); NLRB v. IBEW Local
357, 445 F.2d 1015, 1016 (9th Cir. 1971); Concrete Materials of Ga., Inc. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 61, 68
(5th Cir. 1971).
154. 599 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1979).
155. The NLRB, in refusing to assert jurisdiction over the Federal Express trucking employ-
ees, relied on sections 2(2) and 2(3) of the NLRA, which exclude employers and employees cov-
ered by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976), from NLRB regulations:
Section 2(2)-Employers-The term "employer" ... shall not include . . . any person
subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, . . .
Section 2(3)-Employees-The term "employee" shall include any employee . . . but
shall not include.., any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway
Labor Act, as amended from time to time. ...
29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 152(3) (1978).
156. 599 F.2d at 817 n.2, quoting Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 477 (1964):
Such decisions. . . are normally reviewable only where the dispute concerning the cor-
rectness of the certification eventuates in a finding by the Board that an unfair labor
practice has been committed as, for example, where an employer refuses to bargain with
a certified representative on the ground that the election was held in an inappropriate
bargaiing unit. In such a case, § 9(d) of the Act makes full provision for judicial review
of the underlying certification order by providing that "such certification and the record
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union argued that the NLRB's decision not to exercise jurisdiction fell
within the exception to this proposition established by the Supreme
Court when it held that representational decisions were reviewable
where the NLRB had acted in contravention of an express statutory
mandate. 57 The Seventh Circuit in Chicago Truck Drivers was unable
to conclude that the NLRB disregarded a clear, specific statutory direc-
tive and, therefore, affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
58
In In re Shippers Interstate Service, Inc. 159 the Seventh Circuit
confronted the issue of whether the filing of bankruptcy proceedings
operated as an automatic stay of NLRB unfair labor practice proceed-
ings against the debtor corporation. 160 The court held that where the
assets of the estate are not threatened and the company is being reorga-
nized rather than liquidated, the filing of a bankruptcy proceeding does
not operate as an automatic stay on the proceedings of the Board.' 6'
The court indicated that a stay could be imposed on a discretionary
basis where a proper showing was made that the regulatory proceed-
ings threatened the estate assets. 62 The court's decision avoided pro-
viding an instantly available, cheap and easy sanctuary from all federal
regulatory proceedings.
OTHER SEVENTH CIRCUIT LABOR LAW CASES IN BRIEF
The Seventh Circuit rendered decisions in three other areas of la-
bor law during the 1979-80 term which merit brief comment. These
cases involved the duty to bargain in good faith, sympathy strikes, and
employee protected activity.
of such investigation shall be included in the transcript of the entire record required to be
filed" in the Court of Appeals.
157. 1d at 818. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). The Kyne exception has been
narrowly construed. See, e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 480-82 (1964); Squillacote
v. Teamsters Local 344, 561 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1977).
158. Chicago Truck Drivers v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 1979). The court did not
reach a decision on the ultimate merits of the union's contention that the employer was subject to
the NLRA. The court's decision was based on a finding that the NLRB did not ignore a specific
statutory directive in declining to conduct the representation election. Id
159. 618 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1980).
160. The corporation in the case had filed for bankruptcy under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898. II U.S.C. § 701 (1978). Bankruptcy Rule 11-14 provides in part that a petition filed
under Chapter XI shall operate as a stay of the commencement or the continuation of any court or
other proceedings against the debtor. As the court noted, the issue raised by this case will soon
become moot, inasmuch as the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 will apply to cases filed on or after Octo-
ber 1, 1979. 618 F.2d at 10.
161. Id at 13.
162. Id
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Duty to Bargain
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, provides that it
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to "refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees."' 63 Collective
bargaining is defined as "the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at rea-
sonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment."' 164 These provisions
obligate the employer and employees' representative to bargain with
each other in good faith with respect to "wages, hours and other terms
and conditions of employment." 1
65
The Seventh Circuit upheld an NLRB determination that an em-
ployer had engaged in bad-faith bargaining in NLRB v. Wright Motors,
Inc. 166 The court recognized that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish
bad-faith bargaining from hard bargaining, but concluded that the em-
ployer's insistence on unreasonable provisions 67 was designed to avoid
negotiation on economic issues and to ensure that no bargain be
reached. 
68
In two other cases involving an employer charged with refusal to
bargain, the Seventh Circuit considered the parameters of mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining. The issue before the court in Keystone
163. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
164. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
165. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210 (1964); NLRB v. Wooster Div.
of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
166. 603 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1979).
167. The court recognized that sometimes, especially if the parties are sophisticated, the only
indicia of bad faith may be the proposals advanced and adhered to. Id at 609-10. The court
quoted the opinion of the ALJ setting forth the unreasonable provisions insisted upon by the
employer:
An "open shop" was guaranteed, limiting the Union's right to secure members and
check off authorizations to pay for the costs of union representation. A lengthy manage-
ment rights clause, not subject to the grievance procedure, gave the Company exclusive
control over hours, work rules, and production, and authorized the Company to subcon-
tract, curtail or shut down its business completely without regard to the effect on employ-
ment. An extraordinary no strike-no lockout clause required the Union to fine "any
employee" who engaged in a prohibited work interruption, granted the Company the
right to seek an injunction and damages against the Union without arbitrating the claim,
made the Union, "its officers, agents, and members" liable individually and collectively
for damages, required the Union to waive its legal right to remove a suit from a State or
Federal court, provided for a $20,000 bond to be forfeited as liquidated damages in the
event of a violation of the article (in addition to actual damages), and limited the author-
ity of an Arbitrator in providing a remedy. An article on arbitration provided only for
limited and permissive arbitration. Hourly wage rates and promotions would be set at
the Company's sole discretion.
Id. at 608 n.5.
168. Id at 6.
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Steel & Wire v. NLRB 169 was whether a change in administrators of a
company's hospital, medical, and surgical benefits program is a term
and condition of employment subject to mandatory collective bargain-
ing.
The Board had held 7 0 that the company's unilateral change of the
administrator of the benefits program was a violation of the Act' 71 be-
cause the identity of the administrator "vitally affected"' 172 terms and
conditions of employment. The Seventh Circuit noted that although
the judgment of the Board was subject to judicial review, the Board's
determination as to what is a mandatory bargaining subject is entitled
to considerable deference. 73 The court, however, expressed doubt that
the Board had applied the proper standard and reasoned that the "vi-
tally affects" test was inapplicable because the identity of the adminis-
trator was "an aspect of the relationship" between the company and its
employees, without a third-party interest being directly implicated. 
74
The Seventh Circuit adopted a case-by-case approach and employed
the legal test of material or significant effect, or impact, upon a term or
condition of employment to determine if a change in program adminis-
trators was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. 175 Finding
169. 606 F.2d 171 (7th Cir. 1979).
170. See Keystone Steel & Wire, 237 N.L.R.B. 763 (1978).
171. The Board determined that the change of administrators violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a)(5),
158 (d)(3) (1976). Id. at 768.
172. 606 F.2d at 175-76. The Board argued that language of the Supreme Court in Allied
Chemical & Alkali Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 179 (1971) deter-
mined the applicable text for selecting subject matters for mandatory bargaining. The Supreme
Court had stated:
We agree with the Board that the principle of Oliver [Local 24, International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959)] and Fibreboard [Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, (1964)] is relevant here; in each case the question is not
whether the third party concern is antagonistic to or compatible with the interests of the
bargaining-unit employees, but whether it vitally affects the terms and conditions of their
employment.
173. 606 F.2d at 176. The Seventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had recently ob-
served that the legislative history evidenced a congressional desire to delegate to the NLRB the
primary responsibility for selecting the subject matters for collective bargaining. Id at 176 n.6,
citing Ford Motor Corp. v. NLRB, 441U.S. 488, 496-97 (1979).
174. Id at 177, quoting Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 501 (1979), where the
Supreme Court stated:
Pittsburgh Plate Glass . . . made it clear that while § 8(d) normally reached "only issues
that settle an aspect of the relationship between the employer and employees . . . mat-
ters involving individuals outside the employment relationship . . . are not wholly ex-
cluded." . . . In such instances, as in Teamsters Union v. Oliver ... and Fibreboard
Corp. v. NLRB. . . .the test is not whether the "third-party concern is antagonistic to or
compatible with the interests of bargaining-unit employees, but whether it vitally affects
the 'terms and conditions' of their employment." . . . Here, however, the matter of in-
plant food prices and services is an aspect of the relationship between Ford and its own
employees. No third-party interest is directly implicated, and the standard of Pittsburgh
Plate Glass has no application. (citations omitted).
175. Id at 178.
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that the change in administrators met this test, 176 the court upheld the
Board's position.
In Davis v. NLRB, 77 the Seventh Circuit considered whether an
employer's economically motivated decision to close a full-service res-
taurant and to reopen the facility five days later as a self-service cafete-
ria was a subject of mandatory collective bargaining. The traditional
position of the Board has been that in all circumstances, except where
an employer has decided "to eliminate itself as an employer," or com-
pletely shuts down a "discrete line of business," the decision to termi-
nate a portion of the business is a mandatory subject of bargaining.'
78
The Board accordingly found that the employer's change in the nature
of the restaurant's operation was a mandatory subject of collective bar-
gaining. 1
79
The Seventh Circuit employed the four-pronged analytical ap-
proach set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp. v. NLRB180 to determine whether the employer's
change in operations was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
At the outset, the court reasoned that the closing of the full-service res-
taurant and the reopening of a self-service cafeteria is a "condition of
employment" for purposes of the Act, because such a decision leads to
the termination of at least some employees. 18 1 Second, the court deter-
mined that bargaining over such a change in operation would promote
a basic purpose of the Act.182 Third, the court found that requiring the
employer to bargain in the circumstances of this case would not signifi-
cantly abridge his freedom to run his business.' 83 Finally, the court
considered the interest of the employees in bargaining over the change
in operations and found that interest to be substantial. 184 The Seventh
Circuit, therefore, concluded that the conversion of the restaurant to
176. The court enumerated six changes which affected the benefits, coverage, and administra-
tion of the benefits plan due to the change in administrators, but placed special emphasis on the
loss of a labor consultant to assist with claim problems. Id at 179.
177. 617 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1979).
178. See Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479 (1972); Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B.
561 (1966); Duty to Bargain About Termination of Operations.- Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB,
92 HARV. L. REv. 768, 773 (1979).
179. Holiday Inn of Benton, 237 N.L.R.B. 1042 (1978).
180. 379 U.S. 203 (1964). (The Supreme Court held it was a refusal to bargain in violation of
the Act when the employer, in an attempt to cut labor costs, subcontracted the work his employees
had previously performed without first negotiating with the collective bargaining unit.)
181. Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 1264, 1268 (7th Cir. 1980).
182. Bargaining, the court stated, would "encourage the peaceful settlement by the parties
themselves of labor disputes." Id at 1268-69.
183. The court emphasized the fact that the change in operations did not involve a major
capital investment or disinvestment. Id at 1269.
184. Id at 1270.
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the cafeteria was a mandatory bargaining subject. 8 5
Sympathy Strikes
While the Norris-La Guardia Act' 86 deprived the federal courts of
the power to enjoin strikes, section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act 87
gave them the power to enforce collective bargaining agreements. 88
The Supreme Court has indicated some willingness to enjoin strikes
where the applicable collective bargaining agreement contains
mandatory arbitration and no-strike clauses. In Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,189 the Supreme Court held that federal
courts may specifically enforce arbitration clauses by enjoining strikes;
but in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 190 the Supreme Court
refused to extend Boys Markets to allow injunctions against sympathy
strikes not based on an arbitrable issue.
In Design & Manufacturing Corp. v. UAW,' 9' the Seventh Circuit
ruled that a sympathy strike could not be enjoined pending arbitration
of the issue of whether the strike itself violated the no-strike clause of
an applicable collective bargaining agreement. 192 The Seventh Circuit
found that the case was directly controlled by Buffalo Forge, and that
an injunction against the strike would constitute an "unwarranted judi-
cial intrusion into the merits of the controversy." '93 The Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision is consistent with the broad statutory prohibition which
prevents a federal court from enjoining strikes in a labor dispute.
In W-I Canteen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 194 the court considered the
legality of a sympathy strike in the context of an unfair labor practice
proceeding. The NLRB had determined that an employer's discharge
185. Id
186. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
187. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
188. These two provisions of federal labor law have presented the courts with conflicting con-
gressional directives. On the one hand, federal courts are directed to uphold collective bargaining
agreements, many of which contain no-strike clauses. If a union strikes in breach of such an
agreement, the only method available to the federal courts to enforce the contract is an injunction
against the strike. On the other hand, the broad proscriptions of the Norris-La Guardia Act direct
the federal courts to refrain from interfering in labor disputes through the issuance of injunctions.
The Supreme Court has recognized this inherent conflict in federal labor policy, and has indicated
some willingness to enjoin strikes where the applicable collective bargaining agreement contains
mandatory arbitration and no-strike clauses.
189. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
190. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
191. 608 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2158 (1980).
192. Id. at 770.
193. Id at 769, citing Zeigler Coal Co. v. UAW, Local 1870, 566 F.2d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 912 (1978).
194. 606 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1979).
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of several employees for engaging in a sympathy strike was a violation
of the Act. 195 The issue before the court was whether the employees
had waived their right to engage in sympathy strikes through clear and
unambiguous provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
The Seventh Circuit examined the no-strike clause of the applica-
ble collective bargaining agreement 96 and concluded that not only was
there no implied exclusion of sympathy strikes, 97 but that in fact the
union had affirmatively waived the right to engage in sympathy
strikes. 98 The court also examined extrinsic evidence, relating prima-
rily to bargaining history, to determine if the parties intended the no-
strike provision to constitute a waiver and concluded that the parties
did so intend. 99 Finding the discharges to be lawful, the Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed the Board's decision.
A waiver of the right to strike should be in clear and unmistakable
language. 200 The general language of the no-strike provision in W-I
Canteen is considerably less than that. 20' Absent a clear and unmistak-
able waiver, the right to participate in a sympathy strike is an employee
right guaranteed by law.20 2 The court's decision in W-I Canteen fails
to adequately protect that right.
Employee Protected Activity
In the Wagner Act 20 3 of 1935, Congress announced that concerted
195. W.I. Canteen Serv., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 609 (1978). Engaging in a sympathy strike with
members of another union is protected, concerted activity within the meaning of section 7 of the
Act. See, Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, aff'd. 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964). This right may be waived by employees by clear and unambiguous
provisions in an outstanding collective bargaining agreement. Where such waiver is made, strik-
ers are unprotected by the Act and are liable to discharge or other discipline. See NLRB v.
Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974); NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 7 (1953);
NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
196. The no-strike language reads (Art. XVII1): "The Company and the Union agree that
there will be no strike . . . so long as the Company and Union . . . submit to arbitration any
differences which may arise which are not covered by this Agreement." 606 F.2d at 740.
197. Id at 744.
198. Id at 746.
199. Id at 747-48.
200. Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
925 (1975).
201. See note 197 supra. The Board has held that similar (or even more explicit) no-strike
language is not as clear as it might seem to be, and that implied in any such undertaking is an
unspoken but real limitation, namely that the duty to refrain from striking is no broader than the
terms of the grievance and arbitration machinery which is also contained in the contract. This
view finds support in various court decisions. See Island Creek Coal Co. v. United Mine Work-
ers, 507 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1975); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974);
Parade Publications, Inc. v. Philadelphia Mailers Local 14, 459 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1972).
202. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
203. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976)).
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employee activity was to be affirmatively protected as a means of pro-
moting some measure of equality of bargaining power between em-
ployee groups and management. The catalogue of protected activities
is set forth in section 7: "Employees shall have theright to self-organi-
zation, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection. .. ,,04 to which was added in the Taft-
Hartley amendments 20 5 of 1947 "the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities .... -206
Employers were forbidden under section 8(a)(1) "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the right" to engage in
such concerted activities. 20 7 An employer is free, however, to discharge
or otherwise discipline an employee, consistently with the Act, for en-
gaging in activity which is not protected by section 7. Whether em-
ployee activity falls within or without the shelter of section 7 is thus a
definitional issue of utmost importance in the administration of the
Act.
The protection of section 7 rights is most clearly invoked in those
cases dealing with employees who are engaged in union solicitation,
organization or bargaining. The Seventh Circuit confronted such a
case in Chicago Magnesium Castings Co. v. NLRB. 208 The company
involved in that case had laid off the union's shop steward for the day
on which a grievance meeting was scheduled. Without the steward's
knowledge, the company had also arranged for a stewardship election
to be conducted while the grievance meeting was being held.20 9 The
union refused to recognize the validity of the stewardship election and,
as a result, the company refused to continue to process grievances. The
company claimed to have laid off the steward for failure to meet pro-
duction standards.
210
The NLRB determined that the company's involvement in the
shop steward election and the lay-off of the shop steward constituted
204. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
205. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976)).
206. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
207. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). The discharge or discipline of an employee which is so
motivated will also (at least in cases where a union is being organized or is already on the scene)
violate section 8(a)(3), which forbids an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment . . . to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1976).
208. 612 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1980).
209. Id at 1031-32.
210. Id at 1034-35.
235
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violations of the Act.211 The company contended that it had "lawful
reasons" for the lay-off and that its conduct in doing so was, therefore,
not violative of the Act. 2 12 The court rejected this contention, noting
that in the Seventh Circuit "the presence of valid grounds for an em-
ployee's discharge does not legalize a dismissal which was nevertheless
due to a desire to discourage union activity. ' 213 The remedial order of
the Board was therefore enforced.
In Chicago Magnesium Castings Co., the Seventh Circuit dealt
with the type of employee activity which is clearly protected by section
7.214 When the employee involved is not a union official engaged in
protected union conduct, the task of delineating the scope of the protec-
tion afforded by section 7 becomes more difficult.
215
211. The Board determined, inter alia, that the company's conduct violated §§ 8 (a)(1) and (3)
of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (3) (1976). The Board ordered the company to reinstate
the steward with backpay, and to cease and desist from interfering in employee protected activity.
Chicago Magnesium Castings Co., 240 N.L.R.B. No. 57 (1979).
212. The company contended that the lay-off of the steward was the result of his failure to
meet production standards. Chicago Magnesium Castings Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 1028, 1033-34
(7th Cir. 1980).
213. Id at 1034, citing Borek Motor Sales, Inc. v. NLRB, 425 F.2d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S 823 (1970); Satra Belarus, Inc. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 545, 548 (7th Cir. 1978).
214. It is well established that the prosecution of employee grievances is protected by section 7
of the Act. NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205, 206 (7th Cir. 1971). When union officials
pursue such complaints, they are engaged in protected union activity. Glenroy Constr. Co. v.
NLRB, 527 F.2d 465, 468 (7th Cir. 1975).
215. The source of this difficulty often lies in proof of causation. That is, was the employee
discharged or otherwise disciplined because of the exercise of his/her section 7 rights, or because
of some other legitimate and lawful reason? The further removed an employee is from union
activity, the more difficult it becomes to prove that the employer's actions were motivated by an
unlawful purpose (Ze., to discourage the exercise of section 7 rights).
In Chicago Magnesium Castings Co., for example, it was undisputed that the steward who was
laid off had failed to meet the company's production standards (although there was a dispute as to
whether the company had ever informed that employee of the existence of such standards, or
given him an adequate opportunity to meet them). Absent discriminatory purpose, the steward's
lay-off might not have entailed any violation of the Act (the lawfulness of such a lay-off would
also depend on other factors, for example, the terms of the applicable collective bargaining agree-
ment). However, because of the steward's active involvement in union affairs, there was little
difficulty in presenting sufficient circumstantial evidence to the Board and the court to establish
that the lay-off was discriminatorily motivated. As an employee's relationship to the union be-
comes more attenuated, it becomes more difficult to establish that his/her involvement in union or
other protected activity was a motivating factor in the employer's actions.
An employer's decision to discharge or discipline an employee may be influenced by myriad
factors. To what extent must the employer's decision be motivated by considerations of the em-
ployee's involvement in protected activity, before such a decision becomes a violation of the Act?
It is clear on the face of the statutory text, see 29 USC § 158(a)(1) (1976), that it is unlawful
for an employer to discharge or discipline an employee solely because he has engaged in activities
protected by section 7.
Some circuits apply a "but for" standard. If an employer has established a good reason for a
discharge, the discharge does not violate the Act unless the employer's action would not have been
taken "but for" the improper motivation. NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Refining Corp., 598 F.2d
666, 673 (lst Cir. 1979). Accord, Stein Seal Co. v. NLRB, 605 F.2d 703 (3rd Cir. 1979). The
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In Nacker Packing Co. v. NLRB 21 6 the court confronted a case in
which the NLRB had determined that the company unlawfully
harassed and discriminated against an employee through a program of
written and oral warnings and several suspensions. The Board had
summarily affirmed the decision of an Administrative Law Judge that
the company's warnings to, and suspensions of, a certain employee
were motivated by that employee's involvement in activity protected by
section 7.217
The Seventh Circuit reviewed the record in Nacker Packing Co.
and found that the program of oral and written warnings was unlaw-
fully motivated, but that the suspensions were premised on the em-
ployee's "substandard production performance, his unresponsive work
attitude, and his insubordination. ' 21 8 The court noted that while a
written warning system had been in force since 1962, only one such
warning had been given to the employee prior to his participation in an
Seventh Circuit, however, has never endorsed the "but for" standard in this context. Chicago
Magnesium Castings Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 1028, 1034 (7th Cir. 1980).
The Seventh Circuit purports to employ a standard which would afford greater protection to
employee activity which falls within the scope of section 7. In the Seventh Circuit, a suspension or
discharge is unlawful under the Act if it is motivated, even in part, by a desire to discourage
employee protected activity. See NLRB v. Gogin, 575 F.2d 596. 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978): NLRB v.
Tom Wood Pontiac, Inc., 447 F.2d 383, 386 (7th Cir. 1971).
For a number of years, the NLRB has employed the "in part" causation test. See The
Youngstown Osteopathic Hospital Ass'n, 224 N.L.R.B. 574, 575 (1976). In an effort to resolve the
confusion regarding employer motivation cases, the NLRB recently created a more precise analyt-
ical framework. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (1980). The "Wright Line Test" was derived
from the Supreme Court's analysis of employer motivation in a first amendment case, Mt. Healthy
City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), and is intended to replace the
Board's "in part" test.
The "Wright Line Test" involves a two-part analysis. First, the General Counsel will be
required to establish aprimafacie case showing that a "motivating factor" in the employer's deci-
sion was employee conduct that is protected under the NLRA. Second, the burden of proof will
shift to the employer to demonstrate that its decision would have been the same even in the ab-
sence of the protected conduct. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (1980).
216. 615 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1980).
217. The employee had participated in an unsuccessful strike against the company. The em-
ployee filed an unfair labor practice charge against the company based upon its failure to reinstate
him. An ALJ determined that the company had violated sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3) of the Act by
refusing to reinstate the employee, and ordered his reinstatement with backpay. Id. at 458.
Subsequent to his reinstatement, the employee filed the unfair labor practice charge which
provided the basis for this suit. The ALJ concluded that the company had
not purged the unlawful discrimination against Rekow [the employee] during the period
after the first unfair labor practice proceedings but persisted thereafter in a continuing
pattern of discriminatory harassment evidencing its desire to circumvent its obligations
under a remedial reinstatement order, hence discouraging union activity and frustrating
access to Board processes.
Id. at 459.
The Board summarily affirmed the conclusion of the ALJ that the company's conduct violated,
inter alia, sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3) of the Act. See Nacker Packing Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 1134
(1978).
218. Nacker Packing Co. v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 1980).
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unsuccessful strike. 219 Since his reinstatement following the strike, the
employee had received six written warnings and numerous oral admo-
nitions. Although unimpressed by this evidence, the court deferred to
the determination of the Board that the increase in the number of
warnings was discriminatorily motivated.
220
The Seventh Circuit refused, however, to accept the Board's deter-
mination that an unlawful motive had similarly tainted the company's
decision in regard to the suspensions of the employee. 22' In part, the
court based its rejection of the Board's determination on the failure of
the ALJ to sufficiently credit the proffered testimony of other company
employees to the effect that the suspensions were not discriminatorily
motivated, but were instead due to the employee's lack of produc-
tion.
2 2 2
In NLRB v. Campbell "66" Express, Ine.,2 2 3 the Seventh Circuit
overruled a determination of the Board that the company had unlaw-
fully discharged an employee for engaging in activity protected by sec-
tion 7. The record before the court contained numerous indications
that the company had just cause to discharge the employee, 224 and the
court noted that the employee's only union activities consisted of filing
two grievances.
225
The administrative law judge who originally heard the case had
219. Id at 461-62.
220. In noting the disparity in the treatment accorded the employee who had engaged in the
strike activity, as compared to other members of the company's production department, the court
said:
Other production employees who were told during the several months prior to Rekow's
[the employee who had engaged in the strike] reinstatement that their production was too
slow were not given written warnings. Additionally, the record supports the conclusion
that Rekow was particularly carefully watched by the Company's supervisors from the
time of his reinstatement. Not only was this unique supervision system applied only to
Rekow upon his reinstatement but other evidence supports the conclusion that the sys-
tem was applied in less than even-handed manner.
Id at 460.
221. The court adhered to its previously enunciated standard, whereby the suspension or disci-
pline of an employee, if motivated even in part by a desire to discourage protected activity, is
action violative of the Act. Id at 463.
222. Id. To further bolster its determination that the first suspension was properly motivated,
the court pointed to the employee's "failure to follow company instructions" with respect to a
work assignment, and concluded that the company was motivated by "legitimate production and
disciplinary concerns." Id at 464. The court indicated that the second suspension followed an act
of insubordination by the employee. According to the court, the AU determined that the em-
ployee, upon being told to increase his production, had told his supervisor to work faster himself.
Id. at 464 n.8. In the court's view, the company's action in suspending the employee was, there-
fore, motivated by justifiable cause. Id. at 464.
223. 609 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1979).
224. The record indicated, inter alia, that the employee had falsified his job application, stole
"time" and parts from the company, and failed to report to work on several occasions. Id at 313.
225. Id
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determined that a motivating factor behind the company's discharge of
the employee was the filing of the grievances. The Board affirmed that
decision. 226 The Seventh Circuit, however, was unconvinced and con-
cluded that the Board had failed to demonstrate "an affirmative and
persuasive reason why the employer rejected the good cause and chose
the bad one. '227 The court ignored the fact that the company made no
effort to discharge the employee prior to his filing of a grievance, de-
spite having just cause to do So. 2 2 8 While the court focused on the em-
226. Campbell "66" Express, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 953 (1978).
It is axiomatic that punishment of an employee for attempting to file a grievance is interfer-
ence with protected activity prohibited by section 8(a)(l). Greencastle Mfg. Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 272
(1978); Clara Barton Terrace Convalescent Center, 225 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1976). Complaints of this
nature are concerted because they involve the implementation and enforcement of a labor agree-
ment which is an "extension of the concerted activity giving rise to that agreement" which section
7 of the Act guarantees. Bunney Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1516, 1519 (1962). This is so
even though the complaint may be unmeritorious and is asserted by a probationary employee.
See Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.
1967); ARO, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 243 (1976).
It is equally well settled that the advancement of a collective grievance is protected activity,
even if the grievance in question is not formally stated or does not take place under the auspices of
a contractual grievance procedure. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962);
NLRB v. Hoover Design Corp., 402 F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Walls Mfg. Co., 321 F.2d
753 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
227. 609 F.2d at 313, quoting an opinion of the Fourth Circuit for the appropriate standard of
review:
[W]hen an employer demonstrates .. that it had a good ground for the discharge of an
employee apart from any antiunion animus or activity, it is not sufficient to establish a
violation of the Act for the Board to declare that the discharge was "pretextual." ...
"'When good cause for [the] criticism or discharge appears, the burden which is on the
Board is not simply to discover some evidence of improper motive, but to find an affirm-
ative and persuasive reason why the employer rejected the good cause and chose a bad
one.' "Were the rule otherwise, any employee who had been guilty of conduct war-
ranting discharge could protect himself by openly engaging in Union activities, and run
for luck ....
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 1335, 1337 (4th Cir. 1976) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
The Fourth Circuit's standard places an additional and undesirable burden upon the Board
by requiring it "to find an affirmative and persuasive reason why the employer rejected the good
cause and chose a bad one." Such a requirement is undesirable because it assumes that the em-
ployer was motivated by a single cause, either a "good" or "bad" one. In many instances, an
employer is motivated by numerous factors. The employer may not have chosen a "bad" cause,
but if such a cause played any part in the decision to discharge or discipline an employee, a
violation of the Act has occurred. See note 215 supra. The fulfillment of section 7 guarantees
demands no less.
Fortunately, the court's use of the Fourth Circuit standard in this case appears to be an
aberration. In both Nacker Packing Co. v. NLRB and Chicago Magnesium Castings Co. v.
NLRB, which were decided after Campbell "'66"Express, Inc., the Seventh Circuit reverted to its
traditional standard whereby an employer's discharge or discipline of an employee is unlawful if
motivated, even in part, by a desire to discourage protected activity.
228. Despite the employee's absences from work, and probable theft of "time" and parts, no
effort was made to obtain his discharge until after he filed a grievance against the company. The
investigation of the employee's falsified job application was undertaken after, and motivated by,
the employee's filing of a grievance.
Before the ALJ, the Company's representative conceded that he considered the employee's
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ployee's falsified job application, it failed to consider the employer's
motivation in undertaking the investigation which eventually estab-
lished falsification of the application as a lawful reason for the em-
ployee's discharge.
229
If the company's investigation was instigated for the purpose of
finding a pretext to terminate the employee because he had exercised
his section 7 right to file grievances, the employee's discharge was un-
lawful. 230 The right of an employee to file grievances, regardless of
whether or not they are meritorious, must be protected. The Seventh
Circuit should have examined the employer's motivation more closely
in Campbell "66" Express.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Bliznik v. International
Harvester Co. may provide a useful analytical tool in defining the pa-
rameters of a labor organization's duty of fair representation. Al-
though the case lacks precedential value, it illustrates the approach
employed by the Seventh Circuit in determining whether a union's
duty has been fulfilled. In that respect, Bliznik provides guidance not
only to labor organizations, but to the other parties (ie., employers and
individual employees) with a stake in defining the scope of the duty of
fair representation.
During its 1979-80 term, the Seventh Circuit examined the prac-
tices, procedures, and standards employed by the NLRB. The court
analyzed the actions of the Board to determine whether they com-
ported with established judicial and Board precedents. The applicabil-
ity of the NLRA to federally funded day-care centers was examined,
with the court concluding that such operations were exempt from the
filing of a grievance "the last straw" and began his investigation of the employee's job application
after learning the grievance was filed. The ALJ considered this testimony the key to his determi-
nation that the discharge was unlawfully motivated. Campbell "66" Express, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B.
953, attached decision of ALJ at p. 18, 25-26 (1978). It is well settled that the court must ordina-
rily defer to the findings of the ALJ regarding factual issues, particularly when, as here, the credi-
bility of witnesses is critical. NLRB v. Gogin, 575 F.2d 596, 605 (7th Cir. 1978).
229. In the court's words: "When Patt [the company's representative] learned that Darnell
[the employee] had falsified his job application concerning former employment and heard the
totally derogatory reports of his former employers, he had good reason to discharge Darnell." 609
F.2d at 313.
230. The fact that the investigation ultimately resulted in the uncovering of information which
could, under other circumstances, provide a legitimate basis for lawful discharge does not resolve
the issue. Where the investigation itself was aimed at undermining the employee's section 7 right
to file grievances, the subsequent discharge entails a violation of the Act. See American Motors
Corp., 214 N.L.R.B. 455 (1974), enforced, 525 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1975); Aro, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B.
243 (1976).
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coverage of the Act. The Seventh Circuit also considered cases involv-
ing the duty to bargain in good faith, sympathy strikes, and employee-
protected activity. With some exceptions, the court's decisions in those
cases were consistent with established precedent.

